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 One of the ways in which behavioral
economics – the application of insights from
psychology to economics – has extended the
scope of economic analysis has been by
expanding the range of human motives taken
into account to explain economic behavior.
Neoclassical economic theory rests on an
updated notion of the utility concept first
proposed by Bentham, but only recently have
economists begun to explore the full range of
determinants of utility that Bentham
enumerated over 200 years ago.  For example,
Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987; Loomes,
1988) have explored the economic conse-
quences of avoidance of regret and
disappointment, both of which Bentham
included in his short list of pains.  Caplin and
Leahy (1997) discuss implications that follow
from the idea that people derive utility not
only from immediate experiences, but also
from anticipation – what Bentham called
”pleasures and pains of expectation and
imagination” (see, also, Loewenstein, 1987;
Brunnermeier and Parker, 2002).  And game
theory has been similarly enriched by the
expanded recognition of motives such as
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related to what Bentham referred to as
”pleasures of benevolence or good will” and
”pains of enmity.”  Most recently, economists
have been taking account of even more exotic
motives such as ego (Koszegi, 2000; Prelec
and Bodner, 2003) – the ”pleasures of a good
name,” as Bentham expressed it – and identity
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
One important motive that was not
recognized by Bentham (or at least not
included in his list of pleasures and pains),
and which has also not found its way into
contemporary economics is meaning.
Among those with an interest in
understanding human behavior, economists
are unusual in their neglect of meaning.
Philosophers since Plato have viewed search
for meaning as theactivity which brings value
to human life.  And many psychologists (e.g.,
Bruner, 2002; Kegan, 1982) see meaning-
making as the fundamental activity of human
existence.  Perhaps even more than among
philosophers and psychologists, believers in
the importance of meaning can be found in
the ranks of writers, critics, and purveyors of
literature.  In literature, human experiences
are organized and assembled to bring
meaning to what would otherwise be
inchoate experiences and events.  Literature,
therefore, may be the most important arena
in which people express their desire for
meaning and reveal different avenues toward
attaining it.  In writing this paper on the
economics of meaning, therefore, we
experimented with an unusual combination
of collaborators: an economist, psychologist,
and writer.  When we explore the potential
role of meaning in economics, we therefore
draw not only on psychological research, but
also on ideas about meaning revealed in
literature. 
Economists should be interested in
meaning not because others are, but because
meaning has direct significance for
economics.  First and most obviously,
considerable economic activity is devoted to
meaning-making.  Besides religion,1 which is
a huge source of economic activity, there are
self-help books, insight therapies, various
types of volunteer activities and a wide range
of other activities including, for some, work,
that offer meaning as at least one important
benefit.  
Second, meaning is important because it
is an extremely important determinant of
well-being.  Without meaning, psychologists
and philosophers argue, even the most
prosperous existence isn’t worth living.  People
need to feel they have a purpose in their 
life in order to function and feel well psycho-
logically as well as physically (Emmons,
1996).  And, the capacity to find meaning can
attenuate even the most severe hardships
(Taylor, 1983). Victor Frankl (1963) is
especially associated with meaning as a result
of his popular book Man’s Search for Meaning.
Frankl formulated a therapy based on the will
to meaning in the 1930s that he was forced to
personally put to test in German con-
centration camps. To Frankl it is people’s
innate will to find meaning, and not their
striving for pleasure, power, or wealth, that is
the strongest motivation for living.  To the
extent that economics is the science of
promoting well-being with constrained
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1.  An early version of a paper by Ed Glaeser and Spencer Glendon on ”The Demand for Religion” (1997) is indica-
tive of the neglect of meaning by economists, and provides a stark illustration of the pitfalls of doing so. The
authors investigate three theories of why people demand religion: (1) religion provides social connections, (2)
it provides rewards after death or (3) it provides moral instruction. It seems somewhat striking that the possi-
bility that religion may provide people with meaning is not considered.  
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the equation.  
Third, as we attempt to demonstrate, an
exploration of the role of meaning in
economics can help to illuminate both some
of the strengths and limitations of the
assumptions incumbent in the economic
interpretation of behavior as an attempt to
maximize utility.  
Four interpretations of meaning
Although meaning is sometimes treated as a
generic concept, we find it useful to
distinguish between four different inter-
pretations of the concept.  The first one, we
show, is quite amenable to analysis with the
standard economic tool of utility maximi-
zation, but as one goes down the list,
successive concepts of meaning pose an ever-
greater challenge to the traditional economic
model of human behavior.  The four
interpretations are:
• Meaning as a resolution of uncertainty about
preferences: People are often uncertain
about what they want from life.  Finding
meaning, in some cases, can entail learning
about what one values or cares about. 
• Meaning as an extension of self either socially
or temporally: One’s life can often seem
insignificant and inconsequential when
viewed in the context of the span of human
(or even natural) history or of the vast
numbers of people alive in the world.  The
quest for higher meaning may serve the
function of expanding the self through
time and across persons.  
• Meaning as an act of sense-making: The
brain is a sense-making organ, and one of
its most important tasks is to make sense
of the life of its owner.  Such sense-making
typically takes the form of a narrative – a
”life story.”  
• Meaning as an assertion of free will: People
derive personal meaning from the act of
making autonomic choices.  Hence,
meaning-making can involve the assertion
of free will.  
In the remainder of the paper, we elaborate
on these four concepts of meaning and discuss
their potential connection to economics.  
Meaning as a resolution of
uncertainty about preferences
Standard economics, at least in its most
stripped-down form, assumes that people
come to the world with well-defined pre-
ferences then seek to satisfy those preferences
maximally given the objective constraints that
they face.  The reality, of course, is somewhat
different.  As decision research on preference
uncertainty (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson,
1992, 1993; Slovic 1995; Ariely, Loewenstein,
and Prelec, 2003) recognizes, people do not
always know what they want.  Such lack of
information is not at all surprising when it
comes to things that one hasn’t actually
experienced – e.g., items on the menu of a
restaurant one hasn’t visited previously – but
it can also extend to much larger aspects of
life.  The resolution of uncertainty about
higher level preferences – about what’s
important in life – is without doubt one goal
that people often want to attain when they
say that they are seeking meaning.  
Many self-help books and personal growth
programs appear to be focused on meaning-
making of this kind.  For example, ‘Lifespring’
– one of a large number of popular programs
that seems to be aimed precisely at resolving
this type of uncertainty – promises to help
enrollees discover ”what is so vitally important
to you…so that the choices in your life are
truly aligned with your purposes.”  And
among the best selling self-help books are titles
such as ”The life you were born to live: A guide
to finding your life purpose”, and ”Finding
The economics of meaning 63
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were meant to live.”  Such self-help books can
be seen as popularized offshoots of certain
classic texts of literature and philosophy.  The
American Transcendentalists, for example,
were fully focused on what it meant to live an
honorable or meaningful life, and how
dependent such a life was on finding one’s
own path to walk.  ”You think me the child of
circumstance; I make my circumstance,”
wrote Emerson.  Thoreau, who at the very
least wrote like a man who knew what he
wanted, remains popular today, and one
reason for his popularity must rest in people’s
hunger and appreciation for written
enactments of other people resolving their
preferences.  Thoreau lived a life both of
renunciation and appreciation.  The great
poet, Whitman, offers the same written
resolution of preferences in his classic poem
”Song of Myself” that celebrates his love of
nature, culture, people, and his own self. It’s a
poem where the poet’s passionate and varied
preferences in this life are named specifically. 
If having purposes and goals, and gaining
a sense of what one ”really” wants ultimately
enhances happiness, then this kind of
meaning-making is easily reconciled with
utility maximization.  Meaning-making can
be interpreted as the act of reducing preference
uncertainty, which, by providing insights into
what brings utility, allows one to do a better
job of maximizing it.2
Meaning as an extension of self
either socially or temporally
Another way in which people seek meaning,
which points to an alternative interpretation
of the concept, is by seeking to put their lives
into some kind of larger perspective.  Viewed
against the backdrop of human history or
against the multitudes of people currently
alive, one’s own life can easily seem
inconsequential.  To allay such feelings of
inconsequentiality, people may seek to extend
their own being either socially or temporally.
The journalist and activist Dorothy Day was
said to be successful because she had ”a knack
for situating herself and her story into a larger
story.”  Day herself wrote about watching the
crisis of a serious San Francisco earthquake
unfold, and how, while the crisis lasted,
”people loved each other.”  Certainly this
”love” is the result of a sense of an expanded
or extended self most easily experienced in
times of shared jeopardy.
Social Extension involves ameliorating
feelings of inconsequentiality by viewing
oneself in a broader social context, such as a
family, profession, nation or religion.  By
identifying oneself with some larger organi-
zation, one can, in effect, leverage one’s
identity.  An American can think, ”I’m a
citizen of the most powerful nation in the
world,” a Moslem’s identity can include being
a member of the most widespread religion,
and a union member can view himself as part
of a significant social movement.  Indeed,
nationalism, religious identification, and
social class are all sources of identification that
have had enormous consequences for human
society.
As social identity theory highlights,
people’s definitions of themselves as being part
of a group – their social identities – have
important implications for the behaviors of
individuals as well as the functioning of
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2.  There is some question about whether people even have underlying preferences that they could potentially dis-
cover.  Plott (1996) has been the most prominent advocate of the idea that people do have underlying prefer-
ences which they discover through experience and economic activity, but others (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein and
Prelec, 2003) have questioned whether this is in fact the case.
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demonstrated in minimal group studies (e.g.,
Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1982), even when
people are assigned to a group based on some
irrelevant, arbitrary, criterion, such as their
preference between the abstract painters Klee
and Kandinsky, they come to powerfully
identify with their group; they tend to view
their group as superior to other groups on
measurable, valued, dimensions, and are
willing to contribute to their group to
promote its competition with other groups.
Other research has shown that it is possible to
activate either people’s personal or social
identities.  When people’s personal identities
are made salient to them, they are motivated
to enhance themselves as individuals, but
when their social identities are salient they are
motivated less by personal gains and more by
working for the collective interest of the group
(Haslam, 2000).  Hence, if people try to
escape the perceived futility of their own
personal existence by perceiving themselves as
part of a larger social context, such a search
for meaning through social extension can have
important consequences for behavior. 
Temporal extension is a second important
means by which people combat feelings of
inconsequentiality.  The fact that we all have
to die is an important source of feelings of
insignificance and hence meaninglessness,
perhaps particularly in Western societies,
where people often want to avoid the very idea
of it (Ariès, 1981).  It has frequently been
observed that when people are exposed to
thoughts about dying, as in war, in the
presence of a life threatening disease or in the
death of a loved one, beliefs in a higher
meaning and religiosity increase (Baumeister,
1991).  One thing that is offered by religion is
ideas and assurances about a life after death.
In times of war, it has been noted that rates of
suicide goes down – presumably because war
gives people’s lives meaning in terms of a
broader context, and also because it causes
people to focus their attention outward rather
than inward.  ”The rush of battle is a potent
and often lethal addiction,” writes Chris
Hedges, in War Is a Force That Gives Us
Meaning.War, he continues, ”can give us what
we long for in life.” 
In by far the most extensive and far-
reaching line of research on effects of
mortality salience, Greenberg, Solomon and
Pyszczynski (1997) produced direct
experimental evidence of a causal link
between worries about mortality and seeking
meaning through the extension of self.  In
tests of what they call ”terror management
theory” (the source of terror being recog-
nition of one’s own mortality), they show that
reminding people of their own mortality
causes people to embrace more strongly the
beliefs and values of the groups to which they
belong.  Furthermore, when exposed to the
threat of death, people show a greater
appreciation for being a part of a broader
social context with a past and a future, such
as family (Taylor, 1983) or culture (Rosen-
blatt et al., 1989). 
On the other hand, such beliefs and values,
however, might be exactly what is transcended
when mortality becomes more than an idea
and closer to an actuality.  In Flannery
O’Connor’s most famous story, ”A Good Man
Is Hard To Find”, a dying middle class
character recognizes her ”white trash”
murderer known only as ”the misfit” as ”one
of her own.”  In the moments that precede
her death, she extends herself by identifying
not just with her own group, not just with her
culture’s set of beliefs, but rather with all of
humanity.  The murderer recognizes the
woman’s extension of self and comments, ”She
would have been a good woman if there’d been
someone there to kill her all the time,” a line
famous not just for its humor but for its wise
commentary on death’s impact on character.
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transcends social category in this case, and
the story can be read not as a tragedy but as a
depiction of a woman who finally
understands ultimate meaning of ”better late
than never”.
The desire to extend oneself in time, like
the desire to be part of a larger social entity,
has momentous consequences for individual
behavior and societal outcomes.  Thus, for
example, the desire for posterity is un-
doubtedly an important motive underlying
religious beliefs.  Most religions embody
beliefs about life after death.  In the US, more
than 80% of adults believe that life continues
in some way after death (Greeley and Hout,
1999).3 Needless to say, religion has been a
powerful force in human affairs.  But, not only
for religious people can the idea of life ending
completely at death render the experience of
living meaningless. This sense of meaning-
lessness often confronts even the most
stubborn of atheists on their death-beds,
which is why ”death-bed conversions” are
cliché. 
The desire to extend oneself in time may
also underlie the common obsession with
fame.  Fame has been described as a secular
religion (Baumeister, 1991), and like beliefs
in the afterlife, fame can provide at least the
illusion that one will not be ignored and
forgotten once one is dead.  The idea that
fame confers a type of immortality has been
expressed in a wide range of contexts, from
the song lyrics of Irene Cara, ”Remember my
name! Fame! I wanna live forever!,” to the
writings of William Shakespeare: 
”Let fame, that all hunt after in their lives,
Live registered upon our brazen tombs,
And then grace us in the disgrace of death”
(The King, in Love’s Labor’s Lost, act 1, sc. 1, l. 1-7)
Closely related to fame is the desire to leave
some kind of mark on history, a motivation
that has almost certainly played an important
role in the behavior of many politicians,
business-leaders, writers, artists, and other
public figures.  It is even possible that much
academic output is motivated by thoughts of
posterity (over optimism may be another
important ingredient).  Similar motives may
help to explain the prevalence of child-bearing
in the face of evidence that children tend to
decrease happiness (again, another possible
explanation is people’s over optimism that this
pattern won’t apply to them personally).  A
poignant example of a father’s sense of defeat
when his own sense of self cannot be expanded
in time through his schizophrenic son can 
be read in ”Drummond and Son” by Charles
D’Ambrosio.  The character Drummond has
a powerful sense of carrying his own father
into the future, and feels keenly that his son,
due to mental illness, cannot extend his own
sense of self through time; the son feels no
link to posterity or to his ancestors.
The desperate desire for a few moments of
fame or notoriety, which seem to have
increased in the twentieth century with the
rise of visual media, appears to have been a
significant motive in the recent spate of
”school shootings.”  In a television interview,
one of the pre-Columbine school shooters was
asked whether he regretted his actions.  His
response revealed that his big regret was that
people had forgotten about him because
Columbine had overshadowed him.  It may
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3.  A March 1997 Yankelovich Partners survey of 1,018 adults in the United States found that 81% of Americans
agreed with the question ”Do you believe in the existence of heaven, where people live forever with God after
they die?”
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shootings involve adolescents (as opposed to,
for example, college students).  Adolescence is
a time of life that is notoriously fraught with
questions about meaning (Fry, 1998).
Adolescence also seems to be a period in life
in which a search for identity and fame are
especially salient, and in which these motives
often lead to self-destructive and shortsighted
behavior.  
To accommodate meaning as an expansion
of the self through time and across persons,
the standard framework of utility maximi-
zation would require some modification,
although not a major renovation.  Most easily,
one could make utility a function of identity,
as have, in fact, Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
More drastically, one may ‘extend time’ (in
the standard utility maximization problem)
to include the generations before and after an
individual’s life and expand ‘utility’ to include
abstract entities such as an individual’s nation,
religion, or social group.  
Meaning as an act of sense-making
Yet another way to interpret meaning is as the
act of making sense of one’s life as a whole.
Without meaning of this kind, experiences,
life and the world is perceived as chaotic.  We
want to make sense of our experiences for very
much the same reasons that Graham Greene
gave for why he decided to write an
autobiography, which he believed was ”much
the same motive that has made me a novelist:
a desire to reduce a chaos of experience to some
sort of order...”.  A.S. Byatt takes this further
when she writes of narration as ”as much a
part of human nature as breath and the
circulation of blood,” continuing more in line
with the idea of meaning as an effort to achieve
posterity: ”Our stories are like genes, they keep
part of us alive after the end of our story.” 
According to many psychologists (e.g.,
Bruner, 1990; Frankl, 1963; Kegan, 1982)
meaning-making is the most fundamental of
all human mental activities.  As noted by
Gilovich (1991), ”We are predisposed to see
order, pattern, and meaning in the world, and
we find randomness, chaos, and meaningless-
ness unsatisfying. Human nature abhors a lack
of predictability and the absence of meaning”
(p. 9).  People seem to need to make sense of
their experiences and life in order to function
and feel well (Baumeister and Vohs, 2002;
McAdams et al., 1997), and the positive
effects of meaning-making seem to be
especially pronounced when it comes to
coping with negative life events (Davis,
Nolen-Hoeksema, and Larson, 1998). 
Sense-making seems to be a critically
important way that people deal with negative
life outcomes.  This is apparent in literature,
where so many memoirs, indeed, focus on
tragic, premature losses or ”dysfunction.”
There is also substantial evidence that finding
meaning in emotional or traumatic life events
promotes health (e.g., Scheier and Carver,
2001; Ryff and Singer, 1998; Taylor and
Brown, 1988).  Some research supports the
not-all-that-surprising conclusion that
finding meaning in response to stressful life
events is associated with better psychological
health outcomes (e.g., Davis et al., 1998;
Mendola et al., 1990; Tait and Silver, 1989).
More surprisingly, at least two studies have
found a positive connection between
meaning-making and physical health
outcomes.  The first of these studies was an 8-
year study of heart attack victims (Affleck et
al., 1987).  At both 7 weeks and 8 years
following infarction, participants responded
to the following questions: ”Despite all the
problems and worries which your illness has
involved, do you see any possible benefits,
gains or advantages in this experience? If so,
what are they?” Almost 60% answered the
first question in the affirmative at both time
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question falling into categories such as
”change in philosophy of life / values /
religious views,” ”change in mode of life to
increase enjoyment,” and ”learn value of
healthy behavior” (Affleck et al., 1987:31).
Results revealed that participants who cited
benefits from their misfortune 7 weeks after
the first myocardial infarction were less likely
to have another attack and had lower levels of
morbidity 8 years later.  The second study
examined the effects of finding meaning 
on the physical health outcomes of HIV-
seropositive men who had recently
experienced an AIDS-related bereavement
(Bower et al., 1998).  Participants were
classified as having ”discovered meaning” if
they manifested a major shift in values,
priorities, or perspectives in response to the
bereavement in an open-ended interview.
Statements indicative of finding meaning
included, ”I certainly appreciated more the
friends that I have and became much closer
with them” and ”I would say that (his) death
lit up my faith” (Bower et al., 1998:981).
Whereas men who failed to discover meaning
exhibited substantial drops in CD4 cell counts
(a key immunological marker of HIV
progression) over a 2-3 year follow-up period,
those who managed to find meaning showed
no reduction in CD4 cell counts over the same
time period.  Even more remarkably, the
discovery of meaning was associated with a
lower rate of AIDS-related mortality over a 4-
to 9-year follow-up period.
More generally, sense-making seems to be
a common and effective method by which
people blunt diverse forms of setbacks and
disappointments.  In a recent paper on
affective forecasting Wilson and Gilbert
(2003) argue that people’s inclination to make
sense of their experiences is a way to temper
emotional reactions.  Making sense of affective
experiences decreases the intensity and
duration of affect.  In several studies Wilson
and Gilbert show that for groups of subjects
for whom it is made easier to make sense of
an event, both positive and negative emotional
reactions are weaker than for groups of
subjects for whom it is made harder to make
sense.  For instance, in one study Gilbert et al.
(1998) showed that students that were
interviewed and rejected for a desirable job
differed in their unhappiness depending on
how easy it was to rationalize the rejection.  
How do people make sense of the events
of their lives?  In part, they make up stories or
‘scripts’ (Bruner, 2002; Schank, 1990; Schank
and Abelson, 1995).  During  the bombard-
ment of Sarajevo in 1994 a group of theatre
workers in Amsterdam commissioned tales
from different European writers to be read
aloud in theatres in Sarajevo and all over
Europe, every Friday until the fighting ended.
”This project,” wrote A.S. Byatt, ”pitted
storytelling against destruction, imaginative
life against real death.”  In virtually all cultures
and historical periods, people have com-
municated their experiences and under-
standings of the world by telling stories.
Schank and Abelson (1995) argue that
virtually all human knowledge is based on
stories about past experiences.  Even if this is
an overstatement, there is research showing
the stories help people to integrate knowledge,
such as demonstrations that subjects are much
more successful in learning a list of words if
they are instructed to make up a story using
the words (Bower and Clark, 1969).
Narrative-based representations of knowledge
have also been shown to underlie some types
of judgment and decision making (Wyer,
Adaval, and Colcombe, 2002).  For instance,
studies by Pennington and Hastie (1986,
1992) demonstrated that information
conveyed in the form of a narrative has a
greater impact on jury decision-making than
information conveyed in other formats.  In
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participants read transcripts of a court trial,
including testimonies of both prosecution
witnesses and defense witnesses.  These were
either conveyed in the order provided by the
witnesses (witness-order condition) or in the
order it became relevant in the sequence of
events leading to the crime (story-order
condition).  When participants read defense
and prosecution testimonies from different
conditions – e.g., the defense position in
witness order and the prosecution position in
story order – 73% of the participants favored
the testimony conveyed in the story order in
their verdicts.  
The stories that people tell about
themselves rarely follow the utilitarian theme
”I was happy as much of the time as I possibly
could have been given the opportunities that
I faced.” Rather, people spontaneously adopt
classic narrative structures, such as, an
innocent person is beset by crises and setbacks,
but her struggles are finally crowned with
happiness or, at least, wisdom (McAdams et
al., 1997; Wilson and Ross; 2001).  People
tend to focus on and construct stories of
experiences that revolve around specific
common aspects of the experiences.
According to Baumeister and Newman
(1994) people tell stories that revolve around
the extent to which the experiences of the
person or persons that the story is about had
a purpose, were justifiable, were carried out
efficiently and increased or decreased self-
worth.  They further argue for a polarization
in the sense that they don’t make good stories
if they are not towards the end continuum of
those aspects of the experiences.  That is,
people tend to exaggerate the ups and downs,
successes and failures of experiences.
Experiences are either successes or break-
downs in achieving or fulfilling goals; actions
are either morally right or wrong; situations
are either highly controllable or out of control;
and experiences put oneself either in a good
light or a bad light.  Literature both complies
with and complicates such rules of story-
telling.  While a good story or novel must have
a distinct ”conflict” and must attempt to make
some kind of sense of that conflict in a given
character’s life, moral ambiguities in both
situation and character are not only
acceptable, but necessary, if literature is to be
judged as ”true.”  And yet certainly literature
falls flat when nothing is as stake for a
character’s sense of self-worth, or when stories
unfold without seeming purpose.  Only in
‘meta-fiction’ do you find writers making
arguments against narrative and ”sense-
making,” and these arguments by now are a
bit stale.
The propensity to make sense of
experiences by telling stories has profound
implications not only for happiness, but also
for behavior.  People don’t just retrospectively
reconstruct their lives; the stories they tell
about themselves profoundly affect how they
live. As Bruner (1987) expresses it, ”eventually
the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic
processes that guide the self-telling of life
narratives achieve the power to structure
perceptual experience, to organize memory, to
segment and purpose-build the very ‘events’ of
a life.  In the end, we become the auto-
biographical narratives by which we ‘tell about’
our lives” (p. 15).  The implications of this are
profound; perhaps we should be more careful
in choosing the stories we tell about ourselves.
Story-telling matters because the types of
actions and sequences of outcomes that make
us happiest are unlikely to be the same as those
that make for a good story.  Perhaps the most
dramatic example of this is serious
mountaineering or polar exploration which
tends to involve virtually unremitting misery
(Loewenstein, 1999).  At least one important
benefit brought at the expense of this misery,
however, is meaning.   Staying home may be
The economics of meaning 69
06 NOPEC 30 (1) Karlsen+  10-09-04  12:58  Side 69the most fun and relaxing way to spend one’s
summer vacation, but enduring the miseries
of altitude, fear, cold and hunger makes for a
far better narrative. This may be one reason
why people return again and again to such
misery; the actual experience of misery itself
fades and is usurped and transformed by the
retrospective pleasures of having shaped it into
a story to share with others, and with oneself. 
As noted, good stories tend to follow
certain natural trajectories.  The high school
basketball star makes for an interesting story,
but not one that most people would like to
tell about themselves.  In contrast, a story that
involves an eventual triumph over initial
hardships and setbacks is one that is not only
interesting but socially desirable.  Story-
telling, hence, introduces a ‘path-dependence’
to preferences, with some paths being more
desirable than others, even, often, at the
expense of the integral of total utility.   The
propensity for story-telling may well
contribute to the recent finding that people
tend to represent certain kinds of past affective
experiences in terms of their most intense part
(the peak) and their ending.  According to
Frederickson (2000) these moments carry
more weight in retrospective judgments
because they carry more personal meaning
than other moments.  Peaks provide personal
meaning in the sense that it gives the
individual information about ones resources
or capacities of experiencing certain events or
episodes.  Ends give personal meaning in
terms of certainty, that is, the certainty about
what an experience contained. 
On the face of it, one might conclude that
the importance of story-telling is antithetical
to economic accounts of utility maximization,
but a more accurate assessment might be that
story-telling can be construed as a case of
intertemporal choice – early sacrifice made
for a life enriched by meaning.  On the other
hand, it isn’t clear if people are really gaining
happiness per se from such meaning, or
whether meaning is an end in itself.  Even if
the quantity of pleasure would have been the
same, people may prefer being happy on love
than happy on pills.  Or, as John Stuart Mill
puts it ”It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied.”   Consistent with utility-
maximization theory, meaning may be seen as
providing utility.  However, it may not be a
utility that is evaluated only in terms of
amounts of pleasure and pain, but could even
be a type of utility that is enhanced by the
introduction of pain – albeit at the right
moments.  
Meaning as an assertion of free will
A final interpretation of meaning involves the
expression of free will.  People want to believe
that they have some control over their
behavior and hence their destiny – they want
to feel as if they are more than the sum of
nerve firings happening in obscure parts of
their brain.  In line with this, one of the key
assumptions in existential psychology is that
people derive personal meaning from the
individual decisions that they make (Frankl,
1963; Maddi, 1998).  However, long before
Newton uncovered the iron-clad regularity of
physical laws, humans struggled with the
knotty problem of free will.  Are we free agents
or preprogrammed by Nature or God? 
Dostoyevsky articulated this dilemma in a
scene from Notes from the underground in
which his protagonist explicitly articulates to
an assembled audience of scientists that there
is one thing that is always left out in models
of choice,
”But, after all, here is something amazing:
why does it happen that all these
statisticians, sages and lovers of humanity,
when they calculate human advantages
invariably leave one out?” (p. 19)
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missing
”One’s own free unfettered choice, one’s
own fancy, however wild it may be…
What man needs is simply independent
choice, whatever that independence may
cost and wherever it may lead.” (p. 23)
Echoing the same theme, the contemporary
novelist don DeLillo asks in his novel White
Noise,”How do you know whether something
is really what you want to do or just some kind
of nerve impulse in the brain?  Some minor
little activity takes place somewhere in this
unimportant place in one of the brain
hemispheres and suddenly I want to go to
Montana or I don’t want to go to Montana.”  
The act of making autonomous choices
generates utility.  It was identified by J. S. Mill
as ”one of the principal ingredients of human
happiness” (1859/1974:172).  Mill’s assertion
has since been bolstered by diverse lines of
research.  For instance, studies find that one’s
perceived autonomy and extent to which one
sees one’s actions and life to be self determined
is positively related to psychological and
physiological well-being (e.g., Ryan and Deci,
2001).  Efforts to achieve goals, and
satisfaction with achieving those goals, are
greater if those are intrinsically – i.e.,
internally – rather than extrinsically
motivated (Deci, 1975).  Hence, people
appear to derive both meaning and utility
from making autonomous choices.  
On the face of it one might conclude,
contrary to our initial assertion that this
fourth motive is the most difficult of the four
to assimilate to economics, that in fact it is
the easiest.  What contradiction could there
be between utility maximization and the
assertion of free will?  The problem is, people
do not only want to exercise their free will,
but they want to feel that they are exercising
it, and utility maximization in and of itself
provides few clues about the involvement of
will.  A hedonistic interpretation of human
behavior leaves little room for the assertion of
free will.  
How, then, is it possible to know that one
is exercising free will?  The answer, according
to Dostoyevsky is that one can only be certain
one is exercising free will if one does precisely
the opposite of what one wants to do – of
what would make us well off:
”But I repeat for the hundredth time, there
is one case, one only, when man may
purposely, consciously, desire what is
injurious for himself, what is stupid, very
stupid – simply in order to have the right
to desire for himself even what is very
stupid and not to be bound by any
obligation to desire what is only rational.”
(p. 26)
Ironically, then, if we accept Dostoyevsky’s
argument, the motive to make autonomous
choices may actually contribute to self-
destructive behavior.  Of course, if we assume
that people derive pleasure from the assertion
of their free will, then voluntary misery might
be assimilated into a model of utility
maximization.  But this paradox only reveals
the skeleton in the closet: the concept of utility
is irrefutable and, hence, vacuous. 
Conclusions
Economists have probably steered clear of
meaning, not based on a denial of its
importance, but from fear that modeling
meaning, and its role in economic behavior, is
likely to be difficult.  In this paper, we argue
that such fears are largely unjustified.  Not
only are most conceptions of meaning possible
to model (indeed, some already have been –
e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), but, we
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range of behaviors that seem otherwise
incompatible with standard theory.  The
significance of meaning-making extends far
beyond such obvious activities as religion and
self-help media; the search for meaning has
consequences that extend into all domains of
life, including virtually all domains of
economic behavior.  
Turning to the first motive we discussed,
the attempt to resolve uncertainty about
preferences drives a tremendous amount of
behavior.  There is a market for resolving
preference uncertainty, which is discernible
not only by the presence of self-help
counseling on bookshelves and in media.
People also pay to take personality tests and
tests such as the Myers-Briggs test of
occupational interests.  And in magazines and
on the web there are plenty of tests offered to
find out your preferences for how your partner
should look like and be, and even to help you
discover if you truly love your partner.  Even
if these behaviors do not seem to be accord
with the assumption in economics about
stable and coherent preferences, if reducing
uncertainty provide insights to what brings
utility, then this interpretation of meaning-
making is in line with the notion of utility
maximization. 
What needs to be added to standard
economic views, however, are accounts of how
and why people actively want to manipulate
their own preferences, and how not only
fulfillment of goals but also having and
striving towards goals brings utility.  Such
accounts would, for instance, be likely to
contribute to models of labor economics.  For
many people work – even in occupations that
many academics would consider mundane –
is not just a mean to an end, it is not only a
job but a ‘career’ or a ‘calling’ (Baumeister,
1991; Wrzesniewski et al., 1997).  Personal
development is not something that people
engage in on their leisure time, people also
strive for personal development and self-
actualization through their work.  
The desire to extend oneself either socially
or temporally likewise has far-reaching
consequences for individuals and society.  For
example, economists have a difficult time
explaining common behaviors, such as voting,
fighting in wars, and participation in outlawed
political movements, that occur despite the
existence of severe free-rider problems.  Why
do people expose themselves to the costs and
risks associated with these activities when their
individual participation is unlikely to make a
difference.  Part of the answer may be that
synchronizing their own activities with those
of larger collectives helps them to feel an
integral part of those collectives, and hence
decrease feelings of insignificance.  
By enlarging the scope of ”us” in the
dichotomy between ”us” and ”them,” the
social extension of self may change people’s
behavior in significant ways.  In social
contexts, the choices we make may actually
be more guided by what is appropriate to do
and which rules to follow than by the utility
of consequences (March, 1994; Messick,
1999).  And our happiness as part of a
collective may depend as much as the successes
or failures of the collective rather than our
own private successes and failures.  For
instance, we may find great pleasure in the
successes for our favorite soccer or baseball
team, the victories of our countrymen in the
Olympics, the triumph of our supported
presidential candidate, or the high rankings
of our own university.  
Meaning as an act of sense-making also
has far reaching consequences for behavior.
Consider the case of John D. Rockefeller who
spent half his life making money, then, after
recovering from a severe and life threatening
disease, spent the rest of his life involved in
philanthropy.  While economics is well suited
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life, the second part of his life seems to be
more driven by meaning-making than money-
making.  Even if sense-making ultimately
brings utility, there seems to be a demand for
making sense of the world and one’s life that
is not that obviously related to pleasures and
pains.  For instance, when a public figure is
murdered (as was recently the Swedish foreign
minister) people spend an enormous amount
of time reading and watching news about the
event, presumably driven by a wish to make
sense of what has happened.  Likewise, it
seems that the large industry for story telling
that exists in literature and on the screen is
not only driven by peoples’ search for
happiness but also by a wish to make sense of
experiences and events that also have bearings
on their own lives.  
Finally, turning to the interpretation of
meaning as an assertion of free will, is the
potential contradiction between utility
maximization and the assertion of free will
utterly a philosophical query with no real
relevance for human behavior and economics?
People may not scrutinize in each and every
situation whether they choose freely or not,
but may still abhor the idea that they are not
the head of their own decisions.  This
abhorrence is depicted by Naomi Klein who
in her best-selling book ”No Logo” describes
a movement, especially among young people,
that take action against how companies
through their ubiquitous brands try to make
people buy their products.  And there are
various other cases in which people rather
seem to be driven by a wish to make
autonomous choices than by maximizing
utility, such as, youth rebellion and protest
voting.    
We have discussed four different
interpretations of meaning that pose different,
and more or less fundamental, challenges 
to standard economic models of human
behavior.  Although the human quest for
meaning is not captured in standard economic
models, each of the different interpretations
of meaning we discussed, with the possible
exception of meaning as an exertion of free
will, is in fact amenable to interpretation in
economic terms.  If economics do not take
into account meaning, it runs the risk of
missing something important in the
understanding of human behavior.  This
suspicion we share with John Stuart Mill who
in his autobiography asked himself: ”Suppose
that all your objects in life were realized; that
all the changes in institutions and opinions
you are looking forward to, could be
completely effected at this very instant: would
this be a great joy and happiness to you?”
Recognizing that the answer was
unambiguously negative, he reports that ”my
heart sank within me and the whole
foundation on which my life was constructed
fell down.”
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